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AN EQUITABLE REGIME FOR SEABED AND OCEAN
SUBSOIL RESOURCES
THOMAS M. FRANCK*, THOMAS M. KENNEDY** AND CURTIS V.
TRINKO***
The purpose of this essay is to outline a strategy for implement-
ing an equitable regime for the allocation of the seabed and the ocean
subsoil. The importance and timeliness of the subject is based on the
coinciding of three events of landmark historical importance: (1) the
convening in June, 1974 of the Caracas Conference to write a new
international treaty governing the seas and their resources; (2) the
arrival of the long-awaited world resource-and-commodity crunch;
and (3) the virtual termination of political support in the West, par-
ticularly in the United States, for bilateral aid programs to underde-
veloped countries.
The Caracas meetings and other subsequent negotiations will
concern themselves with a broad agenda on which the disposition of
seabed and subsoil resources is but one item. Freedom of navigation,
fisheries, investment guarantees, pollution control, and various other
sea-related subjects will also share the agenda. These issues are inev-
itably related to the question of seabed and subsoil resources if only
because the negotiators will be creating a total package in which the
various items serve as trade-offs in the search for near-unanimity.
The question of seabed and subsoil resources is, nevertheless, of such
overriding importance as to warrant separate analysis.
Ocean mineral resources are the world's last great new frontier
in an era of massive mineral consumption and predictable mineral
shortages. The technological and legal challenge of the opening of this
new frontier must be placed in the context of a greater ethical chal-
lenge to place the world economy on foundations which permit the
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narrowing, rather than the widening, of the gap between rich and
poor nations.
I. THE RUSH TOWARD BROAD SEAWARD EXTENSIONS OF NATIONAL
JURISDICTION
The U.N. Seabed Committee has begun work drafting a treaty
establishing an international regime for the exploration and exploita-
tion of the seabed beyond national jurisdiction, and on the interna-
tional machinery to promote such exploration and exploitation for
the benefit of mankind. This effort has been closely linked to the
problem of defining the area subject to national jurisdiction.
As population expansion, rising standards of living, and the de-
velopment of deep-sea mining technology have made inevitable
man's exploitation of the resources beyond the traditional three-mile
limit, different views emerged as to the manner in which this exploi-
tation should proceed. Many coastal states favor more exclusive juris-
diction over their adjunct sea areas, while noncoastal and some
coastal states support a sharing of jurisdiction over the off-shore seas
by the coastal state and the international community.
While most coastal states have taken the position that their ge-
ography entitles them to almost exclusive rights over the resources of
the sea area adjacent to their coasts, there are nuances of difference
among them. Latin American states, such as Brazil and Uruguay,
describe their exclusive claims in terms of "sovereignty" and the area
claimed in terms of a "territorial sea" of about 200 miles width.' The
majority of Latin American, African, and Asian states make a dis-
tinction between the territorial sea, which they wish to set at 12
miles, and an "economic zone" or "patrimonial sea" of 188 miles.
According to the latter view, the coastal state, in its territorial sea,
would exercise the traditional incidents of sovereignty, and, in the
other 188-mile band, would enjoy exclusive or "sovereign" functional
rights over the area's resources, both renewable and non-renewable,
i.e., fishing and minerals Both the states demanding a 200-mile
sovereign territorial sea and those merely demanding exclusive func-
1. See 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. 3, at 23-29, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973).
2. Cf. the proposals of: Organization of African Unity, id. Vol. 2 at 4; Colombia,
Mexico and Venezuela, id. Vol. 3 at 19; Ecuador, Panama and Peru, id. at 30; Argen-
tina, id. at 78; Algeria, Cameroon, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar,
Mauritius, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia and United Republic of
Tanzania, id. at 87; Pakistan, id. at 106. See also the proposal of Iceland, id. at 23;
China, id. at 71; Australia and Norway, id. at 77. Most of the proposals made a
provision for landlocked and other disadvantaged states to share in the exploitation of
the living resources of the neighboring coastal states. None of the proposals, however,
was specific with regard to the exact implementation of such right and some of the
proposals speak in terms of "privilege." Cf. Canada, India, Kenya and Sri Lanka, id.
at 83.
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tional jurisdiction but not territorial sovereignty over re-
sources-thereby leaving open such matters as navigation-agree
that the seabed and subsoil resources, to a distance of 200 miles,
should become the exclusive preserve of those states endowed with
coastlines. The resultant windfall, based on the length of the coast
rather than on need or population, would be further augmented where
the ocean off the coast happens to have the configuration of a particu-
larly wide submerged shelf. Five coastal nations have shelves that
extend beyond 200 miles at depths of less than 200 meters.3 Australia,
Argentina and Norway have insisted that the coastal state has the
right to retain any jurisdiction-including the entire shelf-to which
it was entitled under prior international law.
"Jurisdiction" or "functional sovereignty"-even if short of out-
right territorial sovereignty-is used by coastal states to include the
following competences:
1. The exclusive national use of the resources of the area and the reten-
tion of the revenues derived therefrom;
2. The exclusive right to authorize and regulate all activities relating to
the exploration and exploitation of the area, which includes the imposi-
tion of pollution control measures and supervision of scientific research;
3. The prerogative of settling according to national-rather than inter-
national-law any dispute arising from such activities.
From an international public-policy point of view, these assertions of
wide functional jurisdiction leave much to be desired. Four of the
3. The five states are Argentina, Australia, Canada, the U.S.A., and the U.S.S.R.
OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, BuREAu OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DEPARTMENT OF
STATE, LIMITS IN THE SEAS, THEORETICAL AREA ALLOCATIONS OF SEABED TO COASTAL
STATE, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY STUDY, Ser. A, No. 46 (August 12, 1972) [hereinafter
cited as OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER].
4. Australia and Norway, supra note 1, at 78 "... the Coastal State has the right
to retain, where the natural prolongation of its land mass extends beyond the
[economic zone- patrimonial sea], the sovereign rights with respect to that area of the
sea-bed and the subsoil thereof which it had under international law before the entry
into force of this Convention: such rights do not extend beyond the outer edge of the
Continental margin."
It may be worth noting that the U.S., due to the open-ended jurisdictional defini-
tion contained within the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§
1331-43 (1970), can be interpreted as now laying claim to jurisdiction over 2500 square
nautical miles of seabed that is more than 200 miles from its coast. See OFFICE OF THE
GEOGRAPHER, supra note 3. A treaty that included a seaward limitation of 200 miles of
national jurisdiction could, therefore, be interpreted as amending the OCS Lands Act.
Congressional action conforming the OCS Lands Act jurisdictional definition with the
eventual treaty is a preferable alternative.
The total global area involved is only 35,800 square nautical miles, as compared
to the 24,632,400 square nautical miles of sea-bed within the 200-mile delimitation. Id.
The area under dispute is somewhat larger if states, such as Argentina, continue to
claim jurisdiction to the edge of the continental margin, as opposed to the 200-meter
isobath mark. Argentina, supra note 1, at 80. See also Columbia, Mexico, and Vene-
zuela, supra note 1, at 21.
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principal beneficiaries of such a policy, according to estimates made
by the United States Government, 5 would be the United States, the
Soviet Union, Australia, and Canada, while the landlocked states,
who stand to gain nothing, include sixteen of the world's poorest
nations (Bolivia, Paraguay, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bhutan, Laos,
Uganda, Chad, Central African Republic, Lesotho, Botswana, Swazi-
land, Mali, Zambia, Rwanda, and Burundi). Yet the extension of
national jurisdiction would not have gained so much favor had the
rich coastal nations not been joined enthusiastically by the poor
states with substantial coastlines. Their lack of technological know-
how makes particularly attractive the idea of claiming an extended
and exclusive sea area which could be exploited on their own terms
in the future. This approach is certainly more enticing than the ac-
ceptance of an international authority which, they suspect, would
tend to serve the interests of the economically powerful and technol-
ogically advanced nations.'
Among both developed and underdeveloped coastal states, there
is no complete agreement on the question of jurisdiction. Canada and
the Soviet Union maintain that the coastal state should have exclu-
sive jurisdiction over the minerals of the continental shelf. They
argue that this position is merely a restatement of what was pre-
viously agreed upon in the 1958 Geneva Convention.7 The Soviet
proposal sets a 500-meter isobath or 100 nautical mile limit on the
area of exclusive rights over continental shelf resources.8 The Canadi-
ans have set no such limit. Others, such as the U.S. and the Nether-
lands, have proposed that the coastal states share with an interna-
tional equitable regime the revenue derived from the exploitation of
the resources in the area between the outer limit of the proposed
5. See OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, supra note 3.
6. See Economic Significance, in terms of Sea-Bed Mineral Resources, of Various
Limits Proposed for National Jurisdiction, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE
COMISSION OF THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEABED AND THE OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE
LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/87 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Economic Significance], in which he refers to the "limited and general nature of the
existing information available on the extent and location of sea-bed minerals." Id. at
5. The disillusioning view of the developing countries vis-a-vis an international ma-
chinery seems to have developed as a result of the failure of the U.N. to solve their
most immediate political and economic problems (decolonization and development).
7. 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. 3, at 29. U.N. Doc. 4/9021 (1973). The Soviet
Union proposal with regard to the limit of the continental shelf does not specify the
rights of the coastal state over such area and seems to maintain the traditional concept
adopted in the Geneva Convention of 1958 that the area beyond the territorial sea is
essentially part of the high sea, excepting only the sovereign rights of the coastal states
over the continental shelf for the purpose of exploring its natural resources. This is
confirmed by the Soviet proposal on fishing which defines the sea area beyond the
territorial sea as part of the high seas. See 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 158, U.N. Doc.
A/8721 (1972).
8. See 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 158, U.N. Doc. A/8721 (1972).
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economic zone and the 200 meter isobath5 In this way, at least some
of the benefits derived from the further extension of national jurisdic-
tion would be redistributed in accordance with an equitable princi-
ple. The U.S. proposes giving the coastal state exclusive rights over
the continental shelf up to a 200-meter depth and favors establish-
ment of a "trusteeship area" of preferential but limited rights for the
coastal states up to the edge of the continental margin.5 The Nether-
lands has proposed 40 nautical miles or a 200 meter isobath as the
outer limit of exclusive jurisdiction and would devote a further 40-
mile-wide "intermediate zone" to the exclusive exploitation of the
coastal state, but subject to the rules and regulations established by
the competent international authority. Under this approach, if the
coastal state were classified by the international authority as an
"advantaged" state-in terms of the proportion of the intermediate
zone to its land area-it would share the exploitation of the interme-
diate zone with "disadvantaged" states in proportion to the rate of
disadvantage."
Similar to the position of the United States, though for different
reasons, is that of states which are geographically disadvantaged, i.e.,
states which are landlocked, shelf-locked, semi-shelf-locked, or
which, like Zaire, have trivial coastlines in relation to their popula-
tion and land-mass. In their view, an equitable share of the benefits
of the sea could only be attained through recognizing a limited juris-
diction for the coastal states over the adjacent sea area, while at the
same time guaranteeing the geographically disadvantaged states a
right to share in the revenue from the exploitation of the non-living
resources. In the Kampala Declaration, the landlocked and geograph-
ically disadvantaged states have staked out a claim to equal partici-
pation in the benefits to be derived from the resources of the seabed
and subsoil beyond the territorial waters of coastal states.
2
II. THE SEARCH FOR AN EQUITABLE PRINCIPLE
An equitable principle applicable to the seabed and subsoil can
be formulated as follows:
No state should be permitted to extend its jurisdiction over seabed
and subsoil resources beyond the limits permitted by existing interna-
tional law without sharing the benefits of such an extension with the rest
of the international community in accordance with each member's need.
9. Draft U.N. Convention on the International Seabed Area. 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. 21, at 130, U.N. Doc. A/8021 (1970); Netherlands proposal concerning an inter-
mediate zone, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. 3, at 111, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973).
10. Supra note 9, at 138-40.
11. Supra note 9.
12. The Kampala Declaration, Kampala, Uganda, March 22, 1974, Art. VIII. See
also the proposal to that effect of Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Nepal and
Singapore, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. 3, at 85, U.N. Doc. A/9021 (1973).
1974
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The rationale for such an equitable principle is that the interna-
tional legal order ought not to be amended in such a way as to transfer
to some states resources previously held in common by all states if
the effect of such transfer is unduly to enrich certain states at the
expense of others, without rational regard for each nation's economic
need. Development of large ocean tracts previously legally or
technologically beyond the reach of states ought to be the occasion
for greater equalization of benefits among states, not for the creation
of new and greater discrepancies.
To gauge how much of the previous res communis will now be
subject to national jurisdiction, one must begin by determining the
present limits. This is not a simple task given the confused state of
the law. The Geneva Convention defines the continental shelf, sub-
ject to the coastal state's sovereign rights, as "the seabed and subsoil
of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 meters or, beyond that limit, to
where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation
of the natural resources of the said areas.' 3 Is the "submarine area"
referred to in the definition limited to the shelf, or could it include
the slope and the rise to the end of the margin? Could it even go
further to the deep sea basin? The legislative history of the definition
does not clarify the problem. The text of the International Law Com-
mission draft, from which the Convention developed, was repeatedly
altered. In 1951, the Commission adopted the "exploitability" test on
the ground that though
it seems likely that a limit fixed at a point where the sea covering the
continental shelf reaches a depth of 200 meters would at present be suffi-
cient for all practical needs; [nevertheless] technical developments in
the near future might make it possible to exploit the resources of the
seabed at a depth of over 200 meters. Moreover, the continental shelf
might well include submarine areas lying at a depth of over 200 meters,
but susceptible of exploitation by means of installations erected in neigh-
boring areas where the depth does not exceed this limit."
In 1953, nonetheless, the Commission abandoned the "exploita-
bility" test on the ground that it "lacks the necessary precision and
might give rise to dispute and uncertainty."'' 5 In its final draft of 1956,
to compound the problem, the Commission retained the 200 meters
criterion, but added to it the exploitability test. And although it
recognized the latter criterion to be imprecise, the Commission's spe-
cial rapporteur now felt, in contradistinction to the Commission's
13. Convention on the Continental Shelf, done April 29, 1958, Art. 1, 15. U.S.T.
471; T.I.A.S. No. 5578.
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1951 view, that "the time still seemed to be remote when technical
development would allow the exploitation of the seabed at a depth
over 200 meters"'6 and that, therefore, no practical difficulties will
arise in the foreseeable future. It was this view which prevailed in the
final text of 1958.
The Commission's guess of 1951 was better than that of 1956 or
1958. The time for technological advance beyond the 200-meter limit
has proven not to be so remote. The industrial capacity to extract
non-living resources from the seabed has advanced in sophistication
and depthward reach far beyond the expectations of the draftsmen
of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. 7 If that Convention
must be read so that the only limit on national jurisdiction expansion
is the limit of "exploitability," then the Convention may inadvert-
ently have sanctioned exclusive national jurisdiction over natural
resources beyond the flat shelf, past the slope and rise onto the very
deep seabed itself. It may have sanctioned the extension of jurisdic-
tion by a technologically advanced state across its own shelf, slope,
rise, adjacent ocean bed, and onto the rise and slope near less ad-
vanced states. It may even be argued that by virtue of the "exploita-
bility" criterion the whole seabed of the world has been inchoately
apportioned among coastal states, to the median line between conti-
nents.6 This, too, invokes a political absurdity, implying that the
16. 11 U.N. GAOR 6, 115th Comm., U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.500 (1956).
17. J. ANDRASSY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE RESOURCES OF THE SEA 84-90 (1970).
For an example of these expectations, see Mouton, Recent Developments in the Tech-
nology of Exploiting the Mineral Resources of the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc.
A/C.13/25 (1958); C. FRANKLIN, THE LAW OF THE SEA: SOME RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 29
(Naval War Coll., Int. L. Studies 1959-60, Vol. 53, 1961); M. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE,
THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 687 (1962). As another author stated:
"Some including advisors to the Marine Sciences Commission, have
stated that it was the intent of the Conference that the definition cover
only the geologic continental shelf which normally ends at 200 meters and
that the purpose of the exploitability test was to permit the development
of nearby adjacent areas." Krueger, The Background of the Doctrine of
the Continental-Shelf and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 10
NAT. RES. J. 442, 473 (1970).
Krueger cited to the following as proponents of this theory: COMMISSION ON MARINE
SCIENCE, ENGINEERING AND RESOURCES, OUR NATION AND THE SEA: A PLAN FOR NATIONAL
ACTION 143-145 (1969); Henkin, Changing Law for the Changing Seas, in UsEs OF THE
SEAS 69,79 (E. Gullion ed. 1968); Henkin, The Outer Limit to the Continental Shelf:
A Reply to Mr. Finlay, 64 AM. J. INT'L. L. 62 (1970); B. OXMAN, THE PREPARATION OF
ARTICLE 1 OF THE CONVENTION ON THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 74 (1968). See also, A Discus-
sion of the Legislative History and Possible Construction of the Convention on the
Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc. A/AC.135/19 (1968).
For additional material, see Henkin, International Law and "The Interests": The
Law of the Seabed, 63 AM. J. INT'L. L. 504 (1970); The United Nations and the
Oceans-Current Issues of the Law of the Sea, in TWENTY-THIRD REPORT OF THE COM-
MISSION TO STUDY THE ORGANIZATION OF PEACE 13 (1973).
18. S. ODA, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF SEA RESOURCES 167 (1963).
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1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf meant to vitiate the Con-
vention on the High Seas by eliminating the latter's subject matter.
This is surely a political as well as ethical absurdity which could not
have been intended by the inopportune legal phrase: "limits of ex-
ploitability."
Somewhat less easily dismissed is the argument that the Geneva
Convention's exploitability test meant to open up to national juris-
diction the subsoil and seabed of the shelf's slope and rise, to the end
of the continental margin. 9 A reading of the Convention, however,
reveals no reason to depart from the literal meaning of its words:
"shelf' means "shelf." In the view of one eminent authority, the
intention behind the "limits of exploitability" criterion was not to
expose vast additional seabed areas to conquest by national technol-
ogy followed by national jurisdiction, but only "to admit of sovereign
rights in marginal areas beyond the 200 meter isobath, in areas which
are not strictly continental shelf but rather depressions, and in areas
intersected by crevasses. . . ." 0 In other words, the "limits of ex-
ploitability" test was meant to take care of local variances, to allow
for instances where the flat shelf was interrupted by incidental
breaks, or where the sharp drop which is the "slope" occurs, excep-
tionally, at a depth slightly more than the usual 200 meters.
Accepting that "shelf' means "shelf," or, with a few exceptions,
submerged areas to a depth no greater than 200 meters, it follows that
most coastal states would acquire very substantial additional areas
of jurisdiction if the international community were to permit the
establishment of 200-mile economic zones."' Using the 200-meter
depth criterion, the average width of the continental shelf is between
30 and 44 nautical miles,2 although a few states, including the U.S.
(off Maine) and Canada (off Newfoundland), have continental
shelves extending, in places, even beyond 200 miles. 3 If such an
agreement materializes, this additional area ought not to be parceled
out without application of equitable economic principles of benefit
distribution. Anything less would constitute an encroachment on the
19. Krueger, supra note 17, at 473, 475.
20. D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 410 (2d ed. 1970).
21. See OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, supra note 3. Also, an untitled, multi-colored
map prepared by the Office of the Geographer, Dept. of State, illustrates this point.
The map's index table is headed "Boundaries separate seabed areas of sharply con-
trasting topographic gradients." The ocean areas are divided into four differently
colored areas designating: shoreline to 200 meter isobath, continental platform greater
than 200 meters (with slopes steeper than 1:40), continental rise area beyond 200
nautical miles, territorial seas claims.
22. For a listing of sources, see ANDRAssy, supra note 17, at 9 n.15. See also A.
SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF 41-42 (1968).
23. See OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, supra note 3.
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res communis"4 without adequate provision to compensate those
whose share in the res communis is concommitantly reduced.25
The stakes in these negotiations are high. Beyond the 200-meter
limit lie extensive deposits of petroleum." The immensity of the
seabed's hydrocarbon reserve, its relatively minor development at
24. W. FRIEDMANN, THE FUTURE OF THE OCEANS 14-16 (1971); E. JONES, LAW OF THE
SEA-OCEANIC RESOURCES 64 (1972). As Prof. Jones commented at 64:
"Thus, the unilateral claims of certain nations extending the breadth
of the territorial sea constitute a process of encroachment upon the inter-
nationally sanctioned doctrine of res communis which endangers the fu-
ture status of the freedom of the seas."
25. This concept of compensation has been raised in discussions of the 200 mile
economic zone. As Georges Wehry, of the Netherlands Mission to the U.N. stated:
"If the zones grow and eventually become accepted as inevitable in
the way they are put forward by a number of farthest reaching states, this
would inevitably lead to demands, which one can hear clearer and clearer
from day to day in these handicapped countries, for compensa-
tion-compensation, of course, not only in the international area, as this
international area, if the 200-mile zone were accepted, would in fact yield
no substantial benefits for many decades or even centuries; so this de-
mand for compensation would mean a demand for compensation also
regarding benefits derived from within the areas of national jurisdiction.
And there will be no escaping from that demand." Wehry, Concepts in
Sharing of Common Heritage Wealth, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH AN-
NUAL LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE AT UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 88 (L.
Alexander ed. 1972).
26. Almost all of the petroleum lies on the landward side of the continental mar-
gin, but at least 32% is deposited seaward of the 200-meter line. The calculations given
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present, and the potential shortages and high prices of petroleum
from land-based sources have heightened interest in these ocean-
based resources. The off-shore hydrocarbon resource is estimated at
approximately 2272 billion barrels." Current world production is ap-
proximately 50-60 million barrels/day, or 20 billion barrels/year. '
Current exploration of both the continental margin and the deep
seabed has also shown that many minerals, such as manganese,
nickel, copper, and cobalt are found in concentrated degrees in nod-
ules lying on the deep seabed at depths of 3,000 meters isobath or
more, although there is little evidence of the existence of such nodules
on the continental shelf, slope, or rise.
2 9
These, then, are the very substantial stakes. Already in the past
two decades, first unilaterally, through the Truman Proclamation on
the Continental Shelf3 0 and, subsequently, through the 1958 Conven-
tion, the international community has surrendered to national juris-
diction those areas between the traditional 3-mile limit and the 200-
meter isobath boundary. In this area are contained the greatest
known mineral and petroleum resources of the seabed and subsoil.
Will the international community now agree to a further give-away
of most of the earth's remaining non-renewable resources currently
still in the res communis? Or will the opportunity for a general reor-
dering be used to establish a more soundly equitable system in which
coastal states are allowed to exercise the jurisdictional control made
Source: Economic Significance, in terms of Sea-Bed Mineral Resources, of Various
Limits Proposed for National Jurisdiction, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL TO THE COMMISSION ON THE PEACEFUL USES OF THE SEABED AND THE
OCEAN FLOOR BEYOND THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION, U.N. Doc.
A/AC.138/87 (1973).
Hydrocarbons are generally thought to be most prevalent on the shelf and upper
slope, with lesser quantities on the lower slope and continental rise. Almost no deposits
are thought to occur on the abyssal plains, ranging in depth from 5,000 to 7,000 meters.
The deep-sea trenches may contain deposits, although at such depths that recovery is
almost an impossibility. Favorable geographic conditions, including the deposition of
sediments and reservoir rocks and possible structural and stratigraphic traps, are also
essential to the accumulation of hydrocarbon deposits. Id. at 12-13.
Whereas, the manganese nodules occur relatively widely on the sea-bed, most
deposits occur below deep water and at substantial distances from the continents,
where sedimentation rates are very low. Id. at 18.
See JONES, supra note 24, at 70-71 (1972).
27. Economic Significance, supra note 6, Table 1 at 14.
28. These are approximate figures based upon past production and predicted
increases in production. Id. at 9; ROYAL DUTcH/SHELL GROUP OF COMPANIES, INFORMA-
TION HANDBOOK 1973-74 60 (1973).
29. Economic Significance, supra note 6, at 18-20; JONES, supra note 24, at 70.
Some nodules have been found in shallow water, although these deposits are not
considered of mineable quality or quantity. Economic Significance, supra note 6, at
20.
30. Friedmann, The Law of the Sea: Past, Present and Future, in THE FATE OF
THE OCEANS 101 (J. Logue ed. 1972). For a text of the Proclamation, see Proclamation
No. 2667, 3 C.F.R. 67 (1945-1948 Comp.).
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inevitable by geography, but as trustees for mankind rather than as
windfall exploiters?
Proposals that seek to operationalize the equitable option all
turn on a regional or international system of sharing, and envision an
allocation either of actual operating rights or of revenues derived from
operations. All proposals distinguish between application of equita-
ble sharing in (1) a limited area seaward of the existing limits of
national jurisdiction, and (2) the rest of the high seas. In the latter
area, all jurisdiction would vest in an international authority and all
revenues earned would be subject to redistribution in accordance
with an equitable formula based on need. In the former, either juris-
diction and the right to mine would be shared between the coastal
state and a regional or international authority, or else the revenues
realized by the coastal states from operations in the area would be
shared.
III. CALCULATING THE FISCAL BASIS FOR AN EQUITABLE REGIME
Revenue sharing, rather than a division of jurisdiction and multi-
plicity of operating authorities, has the advantage of simplicity and
acceptability to coastal states. In practice, there are a number of
bases for calculating the share of revenues derived from the area to
be allocated to the regional or international authority:
(1) a quantum tax. In the case of oil, such a tax would be based
on a percentage of value per barrel as set by international agree-
ment . 3 Gas would be assessed at 6,000 cubic feet per barrel equiva-
lent.
31. One problem would be to ascertain the "internationally agreed price" for the
products. This could be accomplished by an agreed upon panel of economic experts
setting a uniform price level for crude petroleum products on a world market, and then
setting a percentage tax. However, due to the energy crisis and the revised price
schedules of Canada and the OPEC countries, the price of crude oil and natural gas
has rapidly increased since early 1973. As an example of this increase, note the follow-
ing tables entered into the Congressional Record by Senator Chiles (D. Fla.):
Table 1-Canadian Oil Prices in Chicago-Alberta Crude (Pembina)
Date Wellhead Price Transport Cost Export Tax Total
1/1/73 2.96 0.45 0 3.41
9/1/73 3.81 0.45 .40 4.66
12/1/73 3.81 0.45 1.90 6.16
1/1/74 3.81 0.45 2.20 6.46
1/11/74 3.81 0.45 6.40 10.66
Table 2-Venezuelan and Arab Oil Prices [per barrel]
Date Venezuelan crude, Arab light crude,




Source: 120 CONG. Rac. S592 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 1974).
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(2) a percentage tax on the gross revenue derived from the min-
eral extracted. This would be more difficult to administer than the
first method and would be subject to manipulable market variables
reflecting time and place of extraction.
3 2
(3) a percentage tax on all royalties, taxes, bonuses, leasing
fees, etc., derived by the adjacent coastal state from the extracted
minerals. This would be simple in theory, but would, in practice,
prove the least equitable.3 3 Developing nations depend on the taxa-
tion of hydrocarbon and other mineral production for a significant
portion of their income and themselves consume relatively little of
what is produced. Developed nations tend to have alternative sources
of taxation and, being the principal consumers of their own primary
products, tend to impose relatively lighter taxes on their production,
with more allowances and exemptions.
(4) a percentage tax on realized net profits from extraction. The
advantage of this approach is that it does not, like a fixed gross
production tax, penalize the less-profitable but economically impor-
It appears that the recent posted prices will decrease due to consumer-nation pressure
and increased output. TIME, April 22, 1974, at 49.
If one set a 10% tax rate on petroleum products sold beyond 12 miles and one billion
barrels was produced, approximately $1.1 billion of revenue at $11/barrel would be
produced. OPEC countries currently sell their production on a posted price system
with most of these countries exacting a 55 percent tax. See ROYAL DUTCH/SHELL GROUP
OF COMPANIES, INFORMATION HANDBOOK 1973-74, at 52 (1973).
32. For instance, a country may want to differentiate hydrocarbons and minerals
extracted in its economic zone and used domestically and those exported by price
differentials. Such a system could lead to coastal nation rivalry in bidding for exploi-
tive concerns by raising or lowering its price to suit the companies' interests.
33. Through 1968, 5.8 billion dollars in such revenue had been collected by the
U.S. Government on offshore oil. Address by R.D. McCurdy, Economics of Oil and Gas
Operations Offshore, U.S.A., Offshore Technology Conference, May, 1969.
A recent book, speaking in terms of U.S. revenue policy, stated:
"Based on a price of $3.45 per barrel, each one million barrels per day of
production will contribute a royalty of 210 million dollars annually to the
federal treasury (Recent and anticipated increases in the price of crude
will substantially increase this revenue)."
D. KASH, ENERGY UNDER THE OCEANS 222 (1973). For further discussion of these
revenues, see id. at 228.
In explaining the now-shelved trusteeship proposal of President Nixon, John R.
Stevenson indicated that the regime would exact its revenue from royalties, etc. As he
stated:
The trusteeship zone would extend from the 200 meter depth line to
beyond the base of the continental slope. The President contemplated
that the regime for exploration and exploitation would provide for the
collection of substantial mineral royalties to be used for international
community purposes, particularly economic assistance to developing
countries. Stevenson, The United States Proposal for Legal Regulation
of Seabed Mineral Exploitation Beyond National Jurisdiction, 4 NAT.
RFS. LAW. 570, 576 (1971).
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tant operations, those, for example, at greater sea depth where costs
are much higher." A profits tax would take these expenses into ac-
count in calculating the international levy. On the other hand, "prof-
itability" is a notoriously flexible, manipulable term and difficult to
enforce without armies of clerical examiners. Moreover, an interna-
tional revenue-sharing system that does not tax "off the top" invites
national governments to reduce the share available to the regional or
international authority by increasing their own tax take.
It is safe to assume that, at least in the next decade, the bulk of
revenues accruing to an international authority would derive from the
area of shared revenue jurisdiction between the existing 200-meter
isobath limit and the proposed new 200-mile (or continental margin)
boundary, rather than from the further areas that would be wholly
within the jurisdiction of the international authority. Nevertheless,
it is important that any new international regime for the high seas
establish itself both in the areas of mixed (inner) and of absolute
(outer) international jurisdiction. Given the world's insatiable need
for resources and the speed of technological innovation, this may well
be the last opportunity to transfer to direct, effective international
administration those outer areas of the seabed and subsoil beyond the
200-mile limit.
Equitable principles should apply not merely to the question of
jurisdiction and to the collection of revenues from deep sea mining
operations, but also to the income redistributive mechanism and the
internal structure of the international authority to which these reve-
nues accrue. An equitable revenue redistribution mechanism is one
which recognizes that the poor should get a larger share than the rich.
One functional basis would be the formula used by the U.N. in assess-
ing members' dues. Such a "capacity to pay" evaluation would take
into account the G.N.P. of each participating state, its population,
per capita income, and any recent national disasters affecting eco-
nomic viability. 3 An inversion of this formula, so that the capacity
34. As the U.N. Secretary General's Economic Significance Report stated:
"The costs of exploitation increase at an exceedingly rapid rate with
increasing water depth; for example at 330 metres the cost will be at least
four times higher than at 33 metres, where the cost is already twice that
of an on-shore field of similar characteristics. Operations under 300
metres or more of water may be so costly that only giant fields will
perhaps be profitably exploited. In some off-shore areas today, a 2000 to
4000 barrels a day well might be considered an uneconomic discovery.
Distance from shore also influences the economic possibilities of develop-
ing off-shore fields, particularly in the case of natural gas, as there are
no viable alternatives for transporting to shore installations other than
by pipeline (footnotes omitted)." Supra note 6, at 17. See KASH, supra
note 33, at 81-90.
35. 28 U.N. GAOR, Report of the Comm. on Contributions, Supp. 11, U.N. Doc.
A/9011 (1973).
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to pay became the quantum of need, would provide an equitable
sliding scale for determining the proportion of the international fund
to be distributed to each participant.
Another equitable formula is that currently employed by the
U.N. Development Program." This formula would allocate the reve-
nue shares by targeting amounts that each country should receive on
the basis of need and a professional assessment of its program of
development. Instead of using an automatic sliding scale, this ap-
proach substitutes country-by-country analysis of development prob-
lems and focuses on the specific needs of each economy.
A third approach would establish an organic process of decision-
making by an assembly of participating states. Such an assembly, as
well as an international secretariat, would be needed not only for
purposes of budgeting revenues, but also in order to administer the
areas of the high seas which are the outward zone beyond the pro-
posed 200-mile limit. In this area the international authority would
be "sovereign" for purposes of licensing mining, or operating its own
mining enterprise, as well as for making all laws applicable to the
seabed and subsoil. (This leaves aside, as beyond the scope of this
essay, other roles pertaining to pollution control, freedom of naviga-
tion, etc., to which such an Authority might be assigned.)
In addition, as the revenues generated by the operations of the
Authority increase, it might absorb the burden of supplying, adminis-
tering and assisting in the technical implementation of international
assistance programs which are currently operated on a bilateral
basis.37 If, as seems well within the realm of present contemplation,
the international Authority could expect to realize an annual redistri-
butive pool equivalent to 10 billion dollars at present value, the entire
bilateral aid program could be subsumed. While this money
would-and should-continue to come out of the purses of the well-
to-do and go into the world's emptier pockets, the resultant redistri-
butive scheme would have important advantages over the present
bilateral aid arrangements. In particular, the system would be less
vulnerable to the donor state's internal political vagaries, since no
legislative appropriations would be involved. A multilateral system
would be less marred by the external political pressures a donor
brings to bear on recipients. Most important, once a steady source of
income is established to finance development projects, middle and
long-range development planning could, at last, become an interna-
tional reality.
36. 17 U.N. D.P./26 (1973).
37. This would not be an AID program, but instead have no strings attached and
be aimed simply at bringing out national expertise in certain skills and professions.
See Pardo, The Law of the Sea: The United Nations and Ocean Management,
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 25, at 26.
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IV. ADVANTAGES AND POLITICS OF AN EQUITABLE SEA REGIME
There is much in this proposal to commend it to the government
and people of the United States and, indeed, something akin to it
remains an important ingredient in the U.S. proposals for the law of
the sea.3 8 Among the advantages are the following:
(1) it would avoid the potential conflict of a wide-open "race
for ocean space";
(2) it would multilateralize the giving of aid, ensuring that
other developed and rapidly developing states contributed their fair
share alongside the United States, Canada and the Western Europe-
ans;
(3) it would establish an international administration capable
of forming the self-supporting, independent nucleus of an interna-
tional regime to protect the freedom of the high seas beyond national
jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, there are signs that the U.S. position in support
of revenue sharing is being eroded by forces abroad, as well as in the
executive branch, and in Congress.
Among the states that might be expected to benefit most from
revenue sharing-the landlocked, other geographically disadvan-
taged, and even underdeveloped countries with substantial coastlines
(all of which would expect to get back more than they contributed to
an international authority) - there has been little inclination to
embrace the American proposal. In part, this is precisely because it
is the American proposal. However, this relucantce also reflects to a
large extent, an understanding that the U.S. revenue-sharing pro-
posal is linked with other less acceptable measures intended further
to reduce the jurisdiction of coastal states in favor of international
jurisdiction over pollution, navigation, and investment disputes. Di-
vorced from these other considerations, the revenue-sharing proposal
would probably enlist far wider support.
This is not to say that other U.S. proposals may not also be
important and worth pursuing, from the American policy perspec-
tive. At least the proposal relating to free rights of passage through
international waterways stands a relatively good chance of being sup-
ported by many other states on the basis of their own navigational
self-interest. The revenue-sharing proposal, however, would benefit
from being unencumbered by the freight of a "package deal." It
38. See Draft U.N. Convention, supra note 9. For additional material on the draft
seabed treaty, see Knight, The Draft United Nations Convention on the International
Seabed Area: Background, Description and Some Preliminary Thoughts, 8 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 259 (1971). For an account of events concerning U.S. policy since the proposal
was submitted, see Hollick, Seabeds Make Strange Politics, 9 FOREIGN POLIcY 148
(1972-73), and Hollick, United States Oceans Politics, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 467 (1973).
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stands on its own as beneficial, both in the narrower U.S. and broader
international interest.
V. THE "UNILATERALIST" ALTERNATIVE
Although the President and the Departments of State and De-
fense continue to support an internationalist position, there is in-
creasing evidence of a campaign by other federal executive depart-
ments-Treasury and Interior in particular-that favors a unilateral
U.S. approach. A certain amount of support for this near-sighted
effort is being engendered in the Congress. Even as the Caracas Con-
ference gets underway, an equally significant battle appears to be
shaping up within the U.S. Government between the "internation-
alists" and the "unilateralists."
This, of course, has been a battle of long duration. The United
States began the modem era of international ocean's policy with a
"unilateralist" quantum leap: the 1945 Truman Proclamation, which
asserted exclusive U.S. sovereignty over the resources of the seabed
of the contiguous continental shelf. In 1953, the U.S. incorporated
this proclamation into domestic legislation. Neither the proclama-
tion, nor the Submerged Lands Act 3 and the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act,4 specified the seaward limit of U.S. jurisdiction except
to the extent that use of the term "continental shelf" implies a geo-
graphic limitation. Internally, as well as internationally, debate con-
tinues as to the exact location of those limits." In any event, in 1958,
the U.S. participated in the formulation of the Geneva Convention
on the Continental Shelf and was an early signer."2 Pleading the
"limits of exploitability" provision of the 1958 Convention, the U.S.
has continued to permit exploration in depths exceeding 200 meters. 3
Technological limitations, however, have until recently restricted
actual mineral exploitation to well within the 200-meter isobath.
While the situation is rapidly changing, the U.S. is still commit-
ted to the maintenance of some international jurisdiction over the
39. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1970).
40. Id. §§ 1331-43.
41. See text accompanying notes 12-24, supra.
42. The 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf, U.N. Doc.A/Conf. 13/L.55 was
signed on April 29, 1958 by a majority of the states attending the conference, including
the United States. U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 2 OmCIAL REcORDS 57, U.N.
Doc. A/Conf. 13/38. See note 13, supra.
43. In 1961 the Department of the Interior issued a lease for the recovery of
phosphate deposits off the coast of Southern California despite the knowledge that one
deposit was 40 miles seaward and in waters as deep as 4000 feet. Krueger, supra note
17, at 478 n. 135.
In 1967, Interior interpreted Sec. 4F of the OCS Lands Act to apply to the erection
of artificial islands 120 miles off the coast of California. Waters as deep as 6000 feet
separated the proposed sites from the mainland. Id. at 478-79 n. 136.
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seabed beyond the 200-meter depth." This U.S. policy was first ex-
pressed by President Nixon in 1970.11 In that statement, and in draft
treaty articles subsequently submitted to the United Nations Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Be-
yond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, the U.S. proposed limiting
national jurisdiction over resources to depths of no more than 200
meters. 6 Also certain areas beyond the 200 meter depth would be
held by the coastal state as a trusteeship zone.' As noted, this pro-
posal has disappointingly had little support. Although the appear-
ance of international indifference is more tactical than real, and wide
support for the proposal will undoubtedly surface in the hard bar-
gaining at Caracas and beyond, the tactics of the developing states
in seeming to prefer their own unilateralist solutions have strength-
ened the bargaining position of the unilateralists within the U.S.
Government.
Thus, pressures for unilateral interim action are growing. The
energy crisis has precipitated Project Independence, in which Presi-
dent Nixon has committed the U.S. to achieving domestically suffi-
cient energy supplies by 1980.48 In the U.S., those who wish to bring
about a strong international regime may be forced to recognize the
inevitability of some unilateral action. Efforts must, however, con-
tinue to make any such action consistent with the future interna-
tional regime.
The U.S. Government is now considering several unilateral ac-
tions. The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act (H.R. 9 and S.
1134) 4" would authorize the Secretary of the Interior to lease areas of
the deep seabed (i.e., tracts of seabed admittedly in areas beyond the
continental margin) to corporate developers. Those sponsoring this
legislation hope to begin harvesting metal nuggets from the deep
ocean floor. These nodules contain commercially exploitable man-
ganese, copper, nickel, and cobalt. The United Nations Secretary
General has estimated that a single nodule mining venture-and sev-
eral are currently planned by U.S. and foreign companies 5 -could
44. Statement by Ambassador John R. Stevenson, chairman of the U.S. Delega-
tion to the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Plenary Sess., August 22, 1973, p. 3.
45. United States Oceans Policy, Statement by the President, 6 WKLv. COMP.
PRES. Docs. 677-78 (1970).
46. See note 9, supra.
47. Id. Art. 26-30.
48. "The Energy Emergency," Presidential Message to Congress, Nov. 8, 1973, 9
WKLY. COMP. PREs. Docs. 1319, 1322 (1973).
49. See generally Hearings on S. 1134 Before the Subcomm. on Minerals, Materi-
als & Fuels of the Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 1134].
50. Deepsea Ventures, Inc./Tenneco, Inc., Hughes Tool Co., Kennecott Copper
1974
178 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
supply 7.9 percent of the cobalt, 2 percent of the manganese, 1.3
percent of the nickel and .13 percent of the copper needed for global
industry by 1980.5'
While the Department of the Interior has stated that no legisla-
tion is in any way necessary to allow U.S. companies to conduct
exploitation on the deep seabed," the industry is anxious to secure
governmental guarantees on the integrity of its investment. Such a
guaranty program would come close to committing the United States
to facilitating actions by U.S. firms that are incompatible with the
international law the U.S. wants to see established and, arguably,
even with existing international laws.
While nominally subservient to a future regime that might
emerge from present international negotiations, the bill imposes an
obligation on the U.S. to negotiate with other states for recognition
of the "grandfather" rights granted under the Act, something the
State Department knows it could not succeed in obtaining.5 Section
10 (a) does make licenses issued under the proposed Act subject to a
future international regime, but only if "such regime fully recognizes
and protects the exclusive rights of each licensee to develop" its li-
censed area. This would be quite difficult to accomplish. Failing that,
the legislation mandates full restitution to the participating corpora-
tions for lost investment in areas not internationally recognized to be
open to unilateral U.S. development." Obviously, the legislation, if
passed, would place the U.S. hopelessly at cross-purposes with any
conceivable international regime. (Another, even worse, pending
piece of legislation would unilaterally extend United States exclusive
fishing jurisdiction from the present 9 nautical miles beyond our 3-
mile territorial sea to a 200-mile zone. 5 )
Corp., Ocean Resources, Inc., International Nickel Co. (Canada), Sumitomo
Group/MITI (Japan), AMR: Metallgesellschaft/Preussag/Salzgitter (West German),
CNEXO-Societe Le Nickel (France). A. Rothstein & R. Kaufman, The Approaching
Maturity of Deep Ocean Mining-The Pace Quickens, in Hearings on S. 1134, supra
note 49, at 214.
51. Report of the Comm. on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor
Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, at 125, U.N.
Doc. A/8721 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Report].
52. Statement of Leigh Ratiner, Director, Office of Ocean Resources, Dept. of the
Interior, Hearing on Law of the Sea Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Atmosphere
of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., at 24 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as Law of the Sea Hearing].
53. Sec. 10, entitled "Investment Protection," subjects licenses issued thereunder
to a future international seabed regime provided "that the United States fully reim-
burses the licensee for any loss of investment .... The section further puts the U.S.
government in the role of insuring (for an unspecified premium) the licensees against
any loss due to (a) interference with the leased tract's development or (b) any unau-
thorized recovery of hard minerals.
54. Hearings on S. Res. 82 Before the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 93d
Cong., 1st Sess., at 50 (1973).
55. S. 1988, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), referred to the Committee on Commerce.
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Unilateral action by the U.S. will inevitably sink the prospects
of a successful international regime's emerging from the international
negotiations. Hearings on Senate Resolution 82,56 which endorsed the
objectives envisioned by President Nixon's ocean policy statement of
May 23, 1970, were held on June 19, 1973.11 The Department of State
representative, referring specifically to H.R. 9 and S. 1988 stated that
their passage "would have potentially disastrous effects on the possi-
bility of achieving a success at the Law of the Sea Conference." His
reasoning was clear: "foreign countries that have been roundly criti-
cized-and I feel justly so-by the United States for unilaterally
extending their jurisdiction to the detriment, not only of the U.S. but
of the international community generally, would believe and feel that
the U.S. [in passing H.R. 9 or S. 1988] would be doing exactly that
for which other countries have been criticized."59
Representative Donald Fraser, a Congressional participant in the
United States delegation to the U.N., took part in floor debate over
The Interim Fisheries Zone Extension and Management Act of 1973 (S. 1988) applies
solely to anadromous species, e.g., salmon (Sec. 4(a)). It also strongly exhorts the
Secretary of State to initiate and conclude international treaties to promote and con-
serve coastal fishing (Sec. 5). The Act shall "cease to be in effect on the date the Law
of the Sea Treaty or Treaties now being developed regarding fisheries jurisdiction and
conservation shall enter into force." (Sec. 10) The treaty language is, however, purely
hortatory.
While 12 nations now claim 200-mile fishing zones (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Republic of Korea, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Sierra
Leone, and Uruguay: International Boundary Study, Limits in the Seas, National
Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, Ser. A, Pub. No. 36 (1972) (with corrections to
March, 1972) issued by the Geographer, U.S. Department of State, reprinted in Law
of the Sea Hearing, supra note 52, at 71-72), the vast majority of coastal states do
adhere to a 12-mile limit. Id. The present United States fisheries policy utilizes a
species approach with preferential rights for the coastal states (see United States of
America: Revised Draft Fisheries Article, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.11/L.9, reprinted in
Report, supra note 51, at 175). S. 1988, in contrast, establishes an exclusive coastal
state jurisdictional belt for anadromous species. It is hardly sound policy for the U.S.
to espouse contradictory solutions to the fisheries problem. The distinction between
preferential and exclusive coastal rights is significant. Under the latter, the U.S. long-
distance fishing fleets (comprising 20 percent of the U.S. fishing industry) would be
hampered by the almost certain retaliation by virtually every other coastal nation. In
1972 the fish and shellfish landed by U.S. fishing craft in international waters off
foreign shores were valued at $155,723,000. The total U.S. catch was valued at
$765,500,000. Hearing on S. Res. 82 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Int'l. Envi-
ronment of the Senate Foreign Relations Comm., 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 29 (1973);
[hereinafter Hearings on S. Res. 82].
56. S. Res. 82, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., adopted unanimously July 9, 1973, 119 CONG.
REC. S 12810 (daily ed. July 9, 1973).
57. Hearings on S. Res. 82, supra note 55.
58. Id. at 23-24.
59. Id. at 24.
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H.Res. 330,10 the House counterpart of S. 82. On April 2, 1973, he
asked:
Well, the United States could unilaterally assert jurisdiction to 200 miles
or to a 200-meter depth or to 1,000 or to 10,000 miles, but do we want
to? We could make the assertion, but if we did it unilaterally, this would
provide a source of conflict with other nations which would take the
position that this is not an accepted international standard. We have
criticized other nations for making unilateral claims to vast areas of the
international ocean, and we have steadfastly refused.to recognize such
unilateral claims, believing such matters are properly a subject for inter-
national agreement in precisely the kind of forum which we have in the
forthcoming law of the sea conference.6'
The Administration continues to resist unilateral congressional
action and, instead, has asked Congress to give U.S. negotiators until
1975 to work out an acceptable international ocean regime .
2
Nevertheless, congressional hearings have already been held on H.R.
9,13 and the Administration is preparing its own version of a seabed
mining act should treaty talks stall."
More ominously, the Administration has begun its own program
of unilateral encroachment on the seabed despite its opposition to
H.R. 9 and S. 1988. On July 3, 1973, the Department of the Interior
began issuing oil and gas leases for portions of the outer continental
shelf up to a 600-meter depth, pursuant to the procedures and open-
ended authority contained in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
Accompanying the July 3rd announcement was a caveat which
stated: "Nothing contained in this call for nominations or in the
issuance of new leasing maps should be interpreted as being incon-
sistent with the President's Oceans Policy Statement of May 23,
1970, relating to offshore development beyond the 200 meter depth
contour. Leases ultimately issued beyond 200 meters will be subject
to the international regime to be agreed upon." That caveat has
been superseded by the Interior Department's recent unex-
plained-and unwarranted-conclusion that "it will not be necessary
to insert any additional provisions in leases to be issued beyond the
200 meter isobath to comply with the President's Oceans Policy and
to accomodate the international negotiations now in progress regard-
60. H.R. Res. 330, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., adopted by a vote of 303 yeas, 52 nays,
78 not voting, April 2, 1973, 119 CONG. REc. H 2310 (daily ed. April 2, 1973).
61. 119 CONG. Rac. H 2312 (daily ed. April 2, 1973).
62. Letter from Charles N. Brower, Acting Legal Adviser and Acting Chairman,
Inter-Agency Task Force on the Law of the Sea to Sen. Henry M. Jackson, Ch., Insular
Affairs Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Interior, March 1, 1973, in Hearings
on S. 1134, supra note 49, at 15 [hereinafter cited as Letter from Brower to Jackson].
63. Hearings on S. 1134, supra note 49.
64. Letter from Brower to Jackson, supra note 62.
65. 38 FED. REG. 9839 (1973); 38 FED. REG. 17743 (1973); similar caveat in 38 FED.
REG. 27307 (1973).
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ing the law of the sea." 6 The Council on Environmental Quality has
recently given qualified approval to deep-sea oil drilling on the outer
continental shelf, 7 indirectly endorsing operations further out than
50 miles by stressing the relatively lower environmental risk of such
far-out drilling to the shorelands.18 Although estimates of the reserves
of petroleum to be found on the U.S. outer. shelf have fluctuated
widely, even within the past year, there is little doubt that whatever
there is will not much longer go untapped.
The analysis means that if the international community is to
benefit from petroleum resources lying even as much as 300 miles off
the U.S. Atlantic coast, on the outer continental shelf or slope, it will
only be because Caracas or its successor meetings will have produced
a generally acceptable package of agreements establishing an inter-
national regime and operationalizing a system of revenue sharing.
VI. HOLDING THE LINE AGAINST THE UNILATERALIST OPrION
As yet, the United States remains committed to a multilateral
revenue-sharing plan for the windfall of scarce resources that lie be-
yond the present reach of national jurisdiction. Revenue sharing is
the fourth of the five principles pertaining to coastal areas promul-
gated by the U.S. delegation at the Seabed Committee.70 On August
10, 1972, the U.S. representative to this committee, noting his "con-
clusion from previous exploitation patterns that a significant portion
of the total international revenues will come from the continental
margin off the United States in early years,"'" nevertheless stated
that
[w]e continue to believe that the equitable distribution of benefits from
the seabeds can best be assured if treaty standards provide for sharing
some of the revenues from continental margin minerals with the interna-
tional community, particularly for the benefit of developing countries.'
The Draft Articles on the Coastal Seabed Economic Area sub-
mitted by the U.S. on July 18, 1973, provided in Article 2, sec. (3):
"the coastal state shall make available in accordance with the
provisions of Article -, such share of revenues in respect of mineral
resources exploitation from such part of the Coastal Seabed Eco-
66. 38 FED. REG. 30457 (1973).
67. N.Y. Times, March 23, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
68. Id. at col. 7.
69. Almost 50 billion barrels were reported in the autumn of 1973, but a revised
estimate of less than half that amount was issued by the U.S. Geological Survey in
the spring of 1974. Id.
70. The U.S. delegation to the Seabed Committee has repeatedly restated its
position. See for example, Statement by Hon. John R. Stevenson to the U.N. Seabed




182 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY
nomic Area as is specified in that Article."73 The statement accompa-
nying the Draft Articles noted that "[r]evenue sharing is, in our
view, an important element in an overall comprehensive settlement
of the law of the sea issues which. . . could have specific application
to resolving the issue of the outer limit of coastal state resource juris-
diction."74 Remarking that few nations had spoken in favor of revenue
sharing, the U.S. delegation concluded that perhaps no real discus-
sion of revenue sharing was possible until other nations "have some
better idea of the role which revenue sharing will play in an overall
political settlement,"75 i.e., until other countries recognize that reve-
nue sharing by the U.S. is a quid pro quo for their accepting certain
positions advocated by the United States. In addition to the sug-
gested standards for coastal areas,7" the U.S. seeks the protection of
scientific research,77 the conservation and protection of fish stocks,7"
and the freedom of transit through straits.7" It is these additional
caveats to the revenue-sharing proposal which have caused other
states to fail to "rise to the bait."
Yet it is handsome bait. While the U.S. is on record as favoring
the sharing of a substantial portion of the revenues it receives from
exploitation in depths greater than 200 meters, 0 there may even be
more to sweeten the pot. Washington has deliberately left open the
possibility of sharing revenues from exploitation in the closer-in area
between the outer limit of national sovereignty (probably now to be
set at 12 miles) and the end of the 200-meter isobath.5 ' The State
Department's proposal seems to hint that even in this area, which the
Continental Shelf Convention has already placed firmly in national
73. United States of America: Draft Articles for a Chapter on the Rights and
Duties of States in the Coastal Seabed Economic Area, U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/SC.IIIL.35
(1973).
74. Statement by Hon. John R. Stevenson to Subcomm. II of the U.N. Seabed
Committee, July 18, 1973.
75. Id.
76. See note 73 supra.
77. See the Draft Articles for a Chapter on Marine Scientific Research and the
accompanying Statement by Ambassador McKernan, Alternative U.S. Rep. to the
U.N. Seabed Comm., submitted to Subcomm. HI on July 20, 1973.
78. See note 55 supra.
79. U.S. Draft Articles on the Breadth of the Territorial Sea, Straits and Fisheries,
submitted to Subcomm. II of the U.N. Seabed Comm., U.N. Doc. A/AC.138/S.C.lI/
1.40 reprinted in Report of the Seabed Comm., 26 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, U.N. Doc.
A/8421 (1971).
80. Articles 5 and 29, U.S. Draft Convention, supra note 9.
81. Statement by Ambassador Stevenson, supra note 74, at 4. "[W]e recognize
that allowance may have to be made for the fact that the Geneva Convention on the
Continental Shelf already provides coastal States with the sovereign right to explore
and exploit the resources of the shelf to the depth of 200 meters with a somewhat
different, and in our view, less satisfactory, provision for the protection of other inter-
ests in, and uses of, the area than is provided in our draft articles .... Hence, there
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hands for purposes of resource exploitation, at least some types of
international jurisdiction and revenue sharing might be acceptable in
the context of a comprehensive new agreement.
But such agreements are some time off, and are only likely to
result from some loosening up of the U.S. "package." If revenue
sharing, the application of equitable principles to the new territories
beneath the sea being opened up by technology, is worth doing at all,
then it is intrinsically valuable whether or not the final sea law agree-
ment includes other objectives of U.S. policy. If the effect of revenue
sharing is, at last, to place international development assistance on
a sounder basis than the present system of "give-what-you-can" hat-
passing, then that objective ought not to be lost by being encumbered
with other, quite unrelated objectives that make it unacceptable to
the very countries that are the potential beneficiaries of a sound
system of sharing.
Meanwhile, however, the U.S. may soon lose the capability to
negotiate for any system of equitable distribution of ocean exploita-
tion because of the momentum of the unilateralists within the coun-
try and abroad. The best way to counter the unilateralists' thrust
towards a "grab-what-you-can" system may be for the U.S. to take
the initiative by instituting, unilaterally, an interim system of equita-
ble benefit-sharing. The operation of this system should, of course,
be limited to those areas which, by existing international law, are
clearly within the jurisdiction of the United States or which are
within the 200-mile economic "trusteeship" zone which has a prepon-
derant measure of state support. Acting alone, the U.S. could estab-
lish the concept of revenue sharing by unilaterally creating a trust
fund into which would be placed twenty percent of the assessed value
of minerals generated by exploitation off the U.S. shores beyond the
territorial sea. In other words, for each barrel of oil or cubic foot of
gas extracted from the seabed beyond 12 miles from shore, a certain
percentage of the value could be set aside in a government trust fund.
To encourage exploration, the government could permit selective,
temporary price differentials or tax credits.
The statute under which oil and gas leases are now issued for
seabed beyond our territorial sea is the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act of 1953. s2 This act can be amended to:
(1) create a trust fund to expire at the enactment of a suitable
international regime or at the end of a specified renewal term,
e.g., 5 years.
may be some states which will not wish to subject the area between 12 miles and 200
meters to a new legal regime, or they may object to the application, in that area of
one or more of the international standards we propose-for example, revenue shar-
ing .... We welcome active consultation with other delegations on this question."
82. See note 40 supra.
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(2) direct the Secretary of the Interior to collect and place into
such fund a specified portion of the gross revenues generated by
exploitation of the seabed beyond 12 miles from shore.0
(3) direct the Secretary of the Treasury to allow the affected
companies tax credit for those monies paid to the Secretary of
the Interior under (2).
A proposed amendment to that effect is included below. 4
It is perhaps instructive to compare our proposal with the sug-
83. The four methods for determining the amount of tax due have been discussed
previously, see text accompanying notes 31-34, supra. Although the U.S. could adopt
any of the alternatives, the course best suited for eventual adoption by the interna-
tional community is a percentage tax of a posted price per barrel.
84. Proposed Amendments:
"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
of America in Congress assembled. These amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act may be cited as the International Equitable Sharing of Revenues Act.
Section 2. When used in this Act -
(a) The term 'Commercially extracting party' means any person
licensed by the Secretary of the Interior to engage in the recovery
of minerals on the outer continental shelf at a substantial rate of
production (without regard to profit or loss) for the purpose of
marketing or commercial use and does not include recovery for any
other purpose such as sampling, experimenting in recovery meth-
ods, or testing equipment or plant for recovery or treatment of
minerals.
(b) The term 'gross revenue' means all revenues actually received
by a commercially extracting party in a fair market sale of the
unimproved minerals recovered from the outer continental shelf or,
if no such fair market sale occurs, the fair market value as deter-
mined by the Secretary of the Interior, of the unimproved minerals
recovered from the outer continental shelf by the commercially
extracting party.
(c) The term 'person' means any government or unit thereof and
any juridical or natural person.
Section 3. There is hereby established in the U.S. Treasury an Interna-
tional Revenue Sharing Fund. The Secretary of the Interior shall collect
from each commercially extracting party and deposit into this fund each
year an amount equal to 20 per centum of the gross revenues of each
commercially extracting party attributable to the recovery of minerals
located on a portion of the outer continental shelf whose water depth does
not exceed 200 meters. The Secretary of the Interior shall also collect from
each commercially extracting party and deposit into this fund each year
an amount equal to 35 per centum of the gross revenues of each commer-
cially extracting party attributable to the recovery of minerals located on
a portion of the continental shelf whose water depth does exceed 200
meters.
(b) These amendments shall apply to any lease heretofore issued
under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The Secretary of the Inte-
rior shall ascertain the depth position of each lease issued heretofore
under that Act and so notify each leaseholder. The Secretary of the Inte-
rior shall include notification of depth position in each lease issued hence-
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gested escrow fund contained within H.R. 9.55 This rather vague es-
crow fund, into which the U.S. Government would deposit an un-
stated percentage of the licensing and taxing revenues it receives
forth under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act.
(c) From time to time the Secretary of the Treasury shall report in
the Federal Register on the amount contained in the fund.
Section 4. The fund shall continue until the President of the United
States affirms to the Secretary of the Treasury that the international
community has reached general agreement on a regime for the oceans or
until five years from the date of this enactment, whichever occurs earlier,
provided, however, that this act may be extended by appropriate Con-
gressional Act.
(b) If this fund terminates upon affirmation by the President of the
United States that the international community has reached general
agreement on a regime for the oceans, the monies in the fund shall be paid
over by the Secretary of the Treasury to the international body charged
with administering the international ocean regime or, if the President of
the United States shall find that no such body exists, directly to those
developing nations that Congress shall hereafter designate.
(c) If this fund terminates in the absence of an appropriate interna-
tional regime after the passage of five years from the date of this enact-
ment, the monies therein shall be treated by the Secretary of the Treas-
ury as general revenues.
Section 5. The Secretary of the Treasury shall allow to each commercially
extracting party an income tax credit in an amount equal to any monies
collected by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to Section 3 of this Act.
Section 6. Nothing contained in this Act shall be interpreted as an exten-
sion by the United States of jurisdiction over the continental shelf or the
high seas."
For a useful precedent to this proposal, see the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act,
43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1624. An Alaskan Natives Fund is created, §1605, and, inter alia, a
specific percentage of the gross value of the minerals thereafter produced or removed
from certain lands is placed therein, §1608(b) and (c). The provisions for this Fund
are not applicable to the Outer Continental Shelf (§1608 (i)).
85. H.R. 9, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. §9 (1973) which provides:
ESCROW FUND
SEC. 9. A fund shall be established for assistance, as Congress may
hereafter direct, to develop reciprocating States. The United States shall
deposit in this fund each year an amount equivalent to-*per centum of
all license fees collected during that year by the United States pursuant
to section 5(a) and an amount equivalent to-*per centum of all income
tax revenues derived by the United States which are directly attributable
to recovery of hard minerals from the deep seabed pursuant to licenses
issued under this Act: Provided, That the amount deposited by the
United States per license issued and per unrelinquished square kilometer
under license shall not exceed the amount contributed for assistance to
developing reciprocating States by other licensing reciprocating States
(except developing States) per license issued by them and per unrelin-
quished square kilometer licensed by them. For the purposes of this sec-
tion, "developing reciprocating State" means a reciprocating State desig-
nated by the President, taking into consideration per capita gross na-
tional product and other appropriate criteria.
*An appropriate amount to be determined by the Congress.
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from deep seabed exploitation, is meant to aid developing reciprocat-
ing states. This bow toward revenue sharing has been dismissed as
"lip service."80 A percentage of the licensing fee (a mere $5,000 for a
block of 40,000 square surface kilometers7 ) would have to be quite
large to be at all significant. There is provision for sharing with an
international fund an unstated percentage of a tax on revenue "di-
rectly attributable to recovery of hard minerals from the deep seabed
• . . under this Act." 8  But the escrow fund contributions cannot
exceed the rate of contributions of other reciprocating developed
states,9 a "reciprocation" not currently contemplated by any nation
in the world. Most importantly, this fund is mere window-dressing for
what has already, above, been analyzed as an essentially undesirable
unilateralist legislative scheme.1°
Our proposal carries no such additional baggage. An amendment
to the OCS Lands Act would affect operations on the continental
shelf where the vast bulk of mineral wealth lies-not, as does H.R.
9, on the deep seabed. Furthermore, the suggested amendments are
in no sense an assertion of additional jurisdiction by the U.S.
In sum: the United States' effort to preserve an equitable inter-
national co-jurisdiction over coastal waters beyond the 12-mile terri-
torial sea is a laudable one. Actions aimed at preventing unilateral
extensions of U.S. jurisdiction that will frustrate that policy must be
continued. However, current energy demands ensure that the U.S.
will continue to conduct oil and gas exploitation at greater and
greater depths. The likelihood of the international community's view-
ing such exploitation as consistent with a future international regime
is significantly greater if measures are taken now to allocate a portion
of the revenues generated to a trust fund whose monies will eventu-
ally go to such a regime.
86. Knight, The Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act-A Negative View, 10
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 446 (1973).
87. Supra note 85, at Sec. 5 (a).
88. Id. at Sec. 9.
89. Sec. 2(i) of the Act provides: " 'reciprocating state' means any foreign state
designated by the President as a state having legislation or state practice or agreements
with the United States which establish an interim policy and practice comparable to
that of the United States under this Act." Id.
90. See text accompanying notes 52-55, supra.
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